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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Darcy Dean Murphy appeals from the district court's order his 
and ordering his underlying sentence executed. Murphy claims that the district court 
abused its discretion by either revoking his probation or failing to his underlying 
sentence upon revoking probation, and that the Idaho Supreme Court violated his 
constitutional rights by denying part of his motion to augment the record with irrelevant, 
as-yet unprepared transcripts. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In 2010, the state charged Murphy with driving under the influence, enhanced to 
a felony for being at least his third DUI conviction in ten years. (R., pp.29-30.) Murphy 
pleaded guilty to the charge. (R., pp.36-37.) The district court entered a judgment of 
conviction against Murphy and executed a sentence of ten years with three fixed, while 
also retaining jurisdiction. (R., pp.48-51.) After the period of retained jurisdiction, the 
district court placed Murphy on probation and ordered, as a term of that probation, that 
he complete drug court. (R., pp.81-86.) 
On December 30, 2011, the state alleged that Murphy violated his probation by, 
among other things, failing to successfully complete drug court. (R., pp.90-91.) The 
following month, the state moved the district court to discharge Murphy from drug court 
on the basis of Murphy's several violations of the drug court agreement. (R., pp.96-98.) 
The district court reinstated Murphy on probation, again ordering him to complete drug 
court. (See R., p.126.) 
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On February 5, 13, state again alleged that Murphy violated his probation 
drug court 1n respects, most recently by forging green 
an , and a second motion to discharge 
Murphy from drug court. (R., pp.108-11, 126.) Murphy admitted that he violated his 
probation and his drug court agreement, and agreed to discharge from drug court. (Tr., 
p.7, Ls.4-13; p.11, Ls.15-25.) The district court discharged Murphy from drug court (R., 
p.112) and, during a subsequent disposition hearing, revoked Murphy's probation and 
executed his underlying sentence (R, pp.114-16; Tr., p.19, Ls.10-24). 
Murphy filed a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency (R., pp.118-19), which was 
rejected by the district court (R., pp.126-30). Murphy then filed a notice of appeal timely 
from the district court's order revoking probation and ordering Murphy's underlying 
sentence executed. (R., pp.120-22.) 
On appeal, Murphy filed a motion to augment the record with the as-yet 
unprepared transcripts from his December 22, 2010 guilty plea hearing, his February 2, 
2011 sentencing hearing, and his July 13, 2011 retained jurisdiction review hearing. 
(Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support 
Thereof, filed June 27, 2013.) The state objected to Murphy's request for the 
unprepared transcripts. (Objection to "Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing 
Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof," filed July 1, 2013.) The Supreme Court 
entered an order denying the augmentation, without prejudice, noting that "Appellant 
must demonstrate relevance of the transcripts requested to the issues on appeal." 
(Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule without 
Prejudice, dated July 15, 2013 (emphasis original).) 
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Murphy filed a renewed motion to augment, arguing that 
was necessary because "Murphy was 'sworn and examined by 
guilty plea 
court"' when he 
guilty; the sentencing transcript was necessary because "made a 
statement of allocution at that hearing;" and that the jurisdictional review transcript was 
necessary because, again, "Murphy was 'sworn and examined by the court."' 
(Renewed Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in 
Support Thereof, filed September 9, 2013 (hereinafter "Motion").) The state again 
objected to the augmentation, noting that those "prior proceedings were wholly 
unrelated to the [February 2013] revocation of probation that is at issue in this case." 
(Objection to "Renewed Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and 
Statement in Support Thereof," filed September 11, 2013.) The Supreme Court denied 
Murphy's renewed motion to augment. (Order Denying Renewed Motion to Augment 
and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, filed September 27, 2013 (emphasis original).) 
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ISSUES 
on appeal as: 
1. """'"'""'"' Supreme Court denied Murphy due process 
and equal protection when it denied his motion to augment the record with 
transcripts necessary for review of the issues on appeal. 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it revoked Mr. 
Murphy's probation or, alternatively, when it executed his sentence without 
modification when it did so. 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. If this case is assigned to the Idaho Court of Appeals, should that Court decline 
to review the order of the Idaho Supreme Court? Alternatively, has Murphy failed to 
show any constitutional violation resulting from the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his 
motion to augment the record with transcripts that have not been prepared? 
2. Has Murphy failed to show the district court abused its discretion in revoking 
probation or failing to reduce Murphy's sentence upon revoking probation? 
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ARGUMENT 
L 
Murphy Has Failed To Show Any Constitutional Violation Resulting From The Idaho 
Supreme Court's Denial Of His Motion To Auament 
A. Introduction 
Murphy contends that by denying his motion to augment the appellate record 
with the as-yet unprepared transcripts of various hearings, the Idaho Supreme Court 
violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection, and has denied 
him effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-21.) Murphy's 
argument fails. Should this case be assigned to the Idaho Court of Appeals, that Court 
lacks the authority to review the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny Murphy's 
motion. Even if the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of Murphy's motion is reviewed on 
appeal, Murphy has failed to establish a violation of his constitutional rights. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one of 
deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free review of 
whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State 
v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Smith, 135 
Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001 ). 
C. The Idaho Court Of Appeals, Should It Be Assigned This Case, Lacks The 
Authority To Review The Idaho Supreme Court's Decision 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has "disclaim[ed] any authority to review, and, in 
effect, reverse an Idaho Supreme Court decision made on a motion made prior to 
assignment of the case to [the Idaho Court of Appeals] on the ground that the Supreme 
5 
Court was contrary to or federal constitutions or other law." State v. 
1 Idaho 618, 620, 288 P.3d 835 (Ct App. 2012). an ," the 
explained, the Court of Appeais entertaining an 'appear 
from an Idaho Supreme Court decision and is plainly beyond the purview of this Court." 
However, the Idaho Court of Appeals did leave open the possibility of review of such 
motions in some circumstances. Such circumstances may occur, the Court 
indicated, where "the completed appellant's and/or respondent's briefs have refined, 
clarified, or expanded issues on appeal in such a way as to demonstrate the need for 
additional records or transcripts, or where new evidence is presented to support a 
renewed motion." hi 
Should the Idaho Court of Appeals be assigned this case, it lacks the authority to 
review the Idaho Supreme Court's order. Murphy has failed to demonstrate the need 
for additional transcripts, and he has not presented any evidence to support a renewed 
motion to augment the record. The arguments Murphy advances on appeal as to why 
the record should be augmented with the transcripts at issue constitute essentially the 
same arguments he presented to the Idaho Supreme Court in his renewed motion-i.e., 
that the scope of appellate review of a sentence requires consideration of the transcripts 
and that his constitutional rights will be violated without the transcripts. (Compare 
Motion with Appellant's brief, pp.5-21.) 
Because the Idaho Court of Appeals lacks the authority to review and, in effect, 
reverse a decision of the Idaho Supreme Court, and because Murphy has failed to 
provide any new evidence or clarification in his Appellant's brief that would permit the 
Idaho Court of Appeals to do so, the Idaho Court of Appeals must decline, if it is 
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case, the Idaho Supreme Court's of motion 
Even If The Merits Of Murphy"s Argument Are Reviewed On Appeal, Murphy 
Has Failed To Show The Idaho Supreme Court Violated His Constitutional Rights 
To the extent this Court considers the merits of Murphy's constitutional claims, all 
of his arguments fail. Murphy argues that he is entitled to the additional transcripts 
because, he claims, the failure to provide them is a violation of his constitutional rights 
to due process, equal protection, and the effective assistance of appellate counsel. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.5-21.) The Idaho Supreme Court recently rejected the same 
arguments in State v. Brunet, Docket No. 39550, 2013 Opinion No. 108 (Idaho, 
November 13, 2013). 1 
In Brunet, the Court stated: "When an indigent defendant requests that 
transcripts be created and incorporated into a record on appeal, the grounds of the 
appeal must make out a colorable need for the additional transcripts." Brunet, 2013 
Opinion No. 108 at 4 (citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195 (1971 )). 
"[C)olorable need is a matter of law determined by the court based upon the facts 
exhibited." 1st In order to show a colorable need, an appellant must show "the 
requested transcripts contained specific information relevant to [the] appeal." kl 
"[H]ypothesiz[ing] that the lack of ... transcripts could prevent [Murphy] from determining 
whether there were additional issues to raise, or whether there was factual information 
contained in the transcripts that might relate to his arguments" does not demonstrate a 
"colorable need." See kl In other words, an appellant is not entitled to transcripts in 
1 Murphy did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's opinion in Brunet when he 
wrote his brief. 
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order to "search the transcripts for a reason to request and incorporate the transcripts in 
the first place." Id. Such an endeavor is a '"fishing expedition' at taxpayer expense"-
an exercise the constitution does not endorse. See id. in short, "[m]ere speculation or 
hope that something exists does not amount to the appearance or semblance of specific 
information necessary to establish a colorable need." ls;L 
Murphy argues the transcripts from the December 22, 2010 guilty plea hearing, 
the February 2, 2011 sentencing hearing, and the July 13, 2011 retained jurisdiction 
review hearing are relevant, regardless of whether they have been prepared or not, 
because "a district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the 
hearing from which the appeal was filed" but rather "the applicable standard of review 
requires an independent and comprehensive inquiry into the events which occurred 
prior to, as well as the events which occurred during, the probation revocation 
proceedings." (Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.) Although the appellate court's review of a 
sentence is independent, as noted in Brunet, the review is limited to the "entire record 
available to the trial court at sentencing." Brunet, 2013 Opinion No. 108 at 5 (citing 
State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5, 244 P.3d 145, 149 (2010)). 
As in Brunet, the record in this case contains all relevant sentencing materials. It 
includes Murphy's original presentence report prepared in January 2011 (PSI, pp.1-14); 
the APSI prepared for his jurisdictional review hearing (PSI, pp.99-106); the minutes 
from all the hearings for which Murphy desires a transcript (see R., pp.36-37, 46-47, 70-
71); and the court orders that issued as a result of those hearings (see R., pp.48-51, 74-
86). "Therefore, the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing is contained 
within the record on appeal." Brunet, 2013 Opinion No. 108 at 5. As such, Murphy "has 
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failed to demonstrate that he was denied due process or equal protection by this Court's 
refusal to order the creation of transcripts at taxpayer expense in order to augment the 
record on appeal." kl at 6. 
Murphy also argues that "effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of 
access to the relevant transcripts." (Appellant's brief, p.21.) This argument also fails. 
Addressing the claim that "refusal to order the creation of the requested transcripts for 
incorporation into the record" results in the "prospective[ J" denial of the effective 
assistance of counsel, the Court in Brunet concluded that Brunet "failed to demonstrate 
how his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 
without the requested transcripts," noting "the entire record available to the trial court at 
sentencing is contained within the record on appeal." Brunet, 2013 Opinion No. 108 at 
6. The same is true in this case. "This record meets [Murphy's] right to a record 
sufficient to afford adequate and effective appellate review." kl As such, Murphy has 
failed to show a Sixth Amendment violation based on the partial denial of his motion to 
augment. 
Because Murphy failed to show a "colorable need" for any of the transcripts he 
was denied, assuming this Court addresses his claims that the denial of his motion to 
augment with those transcripts violated his constitutional rights, his claims fail. 
11. 
Murphy Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Sentencing Discretion 
A Introduction 
Murphy asserts that the district court abused its sentencing discretion by 
revoking his probation or, alternatively, by not reducing his sentence upon revoking 
9 
(Appellant's pp.21-27.) Murphy to an abuse of 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Moore, 
131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 1 
873 P.2d 144 (1994)). 
183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Sentencing Discretion By Revoking 
Murphy's Probation And Executing His Underlying Sentence 
After two years in drug court, with Murphy failing to follow the rules multiple 
times, being manipulative, dishonest, and forging his green card, the district court 
revoked his probation. (R., pp.114-16.) "Probation is a matter left to the sound 
discretion of the court." I.C. § 19-2601 (4). The decision to revoke probation is also 
within the court's discretion. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 
(2009) (citing State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 
1994)). In reviewing a district court's decision to revoke probation, this Court employs a 
two-step analysis. Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 105, 233 P.3d at 36 (citation omitted). First, 
the Court considers whether the defendant actually violated his probation. kt "If it is 
determined that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his probation, the second 
question is what should be the consequences of that violation." kt A district court's 
decision to revoke probation is a discretionary one that will not be overturned on appeal 
absent an abuse of that discretion. kt 
After the district court revoked Murphy's probation, it executed his underlying 
sentence. (R., pp.114-16.) Upon revoking probation, the district court may, pursuant to 
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Idaho Criminal Rule 35, reduce an underlying sentence. !.C.R. 35. A court's decision 
not to reduce a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject to the well-
established standards governing whether a sentence is excessive. State v. Hanington, 
148 Idaho 26, 27, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 978, 
783 P.2d 315,317 (Ct. App. 1989)). Where a sentence is legal, those standards require 
an appellant to establish that the sentence is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. 
Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 
Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden, the appellant must show that the 
sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 
38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable if appropriate to achieve the primary 
objective of protecting society, and any or all of the related sentencing goals of 
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. State v. Vvolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 
728, 730 (1978). In deference to the trial judge, the Court will not substitute its view of a 
reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 
565,568,650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). 
After Murphy's probation was revoked and his underlying sentence was 
executed, he filed a Rule 35 motion asking the district court to reconsider his sentence. 
(R., pp.118-19.) Rejecting that motion, the district court explained why, in an exercise 
of its discretion, it determined that its disposition was necessary. (R., pp.126-30.) The 
state adopts as part of its argument on appeal the district court's reasonable 
determination, supported by uncontested findings, related in its "Memorandum Decision 
on Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35," a copy 
of which is attached hereto as "Appendix A." 
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On appeal, Murphy argues that the district court abused its discretion by revoking 
probation and executing his underlying sentence, asserting that the district court 
"refused to continue considering rehabilitation in its sentencing determinations" by 
revoking probation, or that executing his sentence deprives Murphy of opportunities for 
rehabilitation. (Appellant's brief, pp.21-27.) His arguments fail. 
First, Murphy attempts to remove the district court's comment that Murphy had 
already "had enough programming" from the context of Murphy's repeated failures 
during drug court, most recently forging his "green card" after he failed to attend AA 
meetings. (See R., pp.109-11; Tr., p.11, Ls.15-17.) Murphy had been manipulative and 
dishonest throughout drug court, and as the district judge reminded him, dishonest 
people cannot succeed in treatment. (Tr., p.18, L.10 - p.19, L.1.) Considering 
Murphy's repeated failures to honestly participate in drug court and foliow the program's 
rules, his probation was not meeting the goals of rehabilitation or protecting society. 
Second, Murphy does not need to continue on probation in order to be rehabilitated; in 
fact, he may still enjoy ample opportunities for rehabilitation while in custody. Finally, 
"[r]ehabilitation-important as it may be-is not the sole objective of our criminal justice 
system." State v. Wargi, 119 Idaho 292, 294, 805 P.2d 498, 500 (Ct. App. 1991 ). In 
addition to rehabilitation, the district court's sentence also provides some deterrence to 
Murphy and others, punishment for continuing criminal behavior, and, most importantly, 
"accomplish[es] the primary objective of protecting society." Toohill, 103 Idaho at 568, 
650 P.2d at 710. The district court properly exercised its discretion when it revoked 
Murphy's probation and executed his underlying sentence. 
12 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
revoking Murphy's probation and executing his underlying sentence. 
DATED this 31st day of December, 2013. 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 31st day of December, 2013, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
RJS/pm 
C ?,~/ffi'c_t~ 
R~NCER 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CHRISTOPHER 0. RiCH, Clerk 
By LUCILLE DANSEREAU 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
STATE OF IDAHO, AND FOR THE OFADA 
THE STATE IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DARCY DEAN MURPHY, 
Case Nos. CR-FE-2010-17464 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF SENTENCE 
PURSUA.NT TO I.C.R. 35 
Defendant. 
The Defendant, DARCY DEA.i'l\J MURPHY, came before this Court for disposition of 
probation violations on February 19, 2013. He had previously been convicted of the offense 
Operating A Motor Vehicle While Under The Influence Of Alcohol (Two Or More Convictions 
Within Ten Years), Felony, LC. §§ 18-8004, 8005(6). The Court imposed a sentence of three (3) 
years fixed and seven (7) years indeterminate for an aggregate term of ten (10) years on February 2. 
201 I. The Court retained jurisdiction for evaluation only, and after he completed the retained 
jurisdiction, the Court suspended the sentence and placed him on probation on July 11, 2011. The 
Court also suspended Murphy's license absolutely for five (5) years. As a condition of his probation, 
the Court ordered Murphy to successfully complete Drug Court. 
The State filed motions for probation violations December 30, 2011, and again on February 
5, 2013. The State also moved the Court to discharge Murphy from Drug Court both times. Murphy 
admitted violating his probation both times. At disposition on the first probation violation, the Court 
reinstated probation and again ordered him to successfully complete Drug Court. On February 19, 
2013, however, the Court revoked his probation and imposed the original sentence. 
Murphy's counsel, David Lorello, timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence 
pursuant to Rule 35, I.C.R. on March 1, 2013. Because Murphy indicated further information would 
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be forthcoming, the Court ordered that any further information be filed no later than Apri 1 I, 2013, or 
the Court would consider it fully submitted. 
ANALYSIS 
Murphy requests leniency. The Court rejects his request. Rule 35, I.C.R., provides in 
pertinent part as follows: 
(M)otions to correct or modify sentences under this rule must be filed within 120 days 
of the entry of the judgment imposing sentence or order releasing retained jurisdiction 
and shall be considered and determined by the court without the admission of 
additional testimony and without oral argument, unless otherwise ordered by the 
Court in its discretion; .... 
The determination of whether to grant the relief requested by Murphy is a matter committed to the 
Court's discretion and the Court's decision is governed by the same standard as the original sentence. 
See State v. Gardner, 127 Idaho 156,164,989 P.2d 615 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Ricks, 120 Idaho 
875 (Ct. App. 1991 ). In this review, the Court employed the standards set forth in State v. Toohill, 
103 Idaho 565,650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982). 
In any sentencing, the primary focus begins with a concern for protection of the public. In this 
case, Murphy pled guilty to Operating A Motor Vehicle While Under The Influence Of Alcohol 
(Two Or More Convictions Within Ten Years), Felony, LC. §§ 18-8004, 8005(6). The maximum 
penalty for this offense is seven (7) years. The fixed portion of a sentence imposed under the Unified 
Sentencing Act is treated as the term of confinement for sentence review purposes. State v. Hayes, 
123 Idaho 26, 27, 843 P.2d 675, 676 (Ct. App. 1992). The Court finds that a three-year (3) fixed 
sentence for Operating A Motor Vehicle While Under The Influence Of Alcohol (Two Or More 
Convictions Within Ten Years), Felony, I.C. §§ 18-8004, 8005(6) is lenient considering the facts of 
this crime and is well within the statutory sentence guidelines. 
The Court understood that this was a matter of discretion and considered several factors both 
in the original sentencings and in deciding this Motion For Reconsideration of its decision to revoke 
probation. In deciding to revoke probation, the Court considered reinstating but found that Murphy 
was likely to commit another crime while on probation and decided he needed the programs 
available to him while incarcerated. 
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If a knowing and intentional probation violation has been proved, revocation is within the 
discretion of the trial court LC. § 20-222; State v. Corder, 115 Idaho 113 7, 1 138, 772 P.2d 1231, 
1232 (Ct. App. 1989). However, if a probationer's violation of a probation condition was not willful, 
or was beyond the probationer's control, a court may not revoke probation and order imprisonment 
without first considering alternative methods to address the violation. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 
U.S. 660, 672-73 (1983); Lafferty, 125 Idaho at 382-83, 870 P.2d at 1341-42. Only if the trial court 
determines that alternatives to imprisonment are not adequate in a particular situation to meet the 
state's legitimate interest in punishment, deterrence, or the protection of society, may the court 
imprison a probationer who has made sufficient, genuine efforts to obey the terms of the probation 
order. Id. In deciding whether revocation of probation is the appropriate response to a violation, the 
court considers whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continued 
probation is consistent with the protection of society. State v. Jones, 123 Idaho 315,318,847 P.2d 
1176, 1179 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554,558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). 
In revoking Murphy's probation, the ColLrt: found, in an exercise of discretion, the probation 
violations were proved and that the violations were willful and within Murphy's control. Murphy 
forged evidence of his attendance in twelve step meetings, as well as other violations. Forgery is 
clearly within his control. The Court considered alternative methods to address the violations and, in 
an exercise of its discretion, found all alternatives were not adequate to meet the state's legitimate 
interest in punishment, deterrence, or the protection of society. He had been in Drug Court for a long 
time and it was not changing his criminal thinking. 
In this case, Murphy was driving the wrong way on a one-way road. After he began to drive 
into oncoming traffic, he quickly turned around. While he admitted to drinking 3 beers, his blood 
alcohol was .295 nearly four times the legal limit. Murphy is a clear danger to the community. In 
prior cases, he refused to take the breathalyzer but also displayed a bad driving pattern. In a 2003 
D.U.I. he was weaving all over the road. 
Although this was Murphy's first felony conviction, Murphy had been convicted of five 
DUis. His alcohol related convictions began in I 990 when he was twenty years old, and he was 
convicted of his first D.UJ. in 1993. 
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He has a significant alcohol problem and his misdemeanor convictions include Open 
Container (1990), Under Age Alcohol Consumption (1990), D.U.I. (1993, 1996, 2003, 2003), 
Unlawful Possession of Alcohol in the Park (1993), Driving Without Privileges/Failing to Purchase a 
Driver's License/Invalid License (1995, 1996, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2005), Leaving the Scene of An 
Accident (2005), Possession of Drug Paraphernalia (I 996), Violation of a No Contact Order (2003), 
Injury to Child amended to Disturbing the Peace (2007), Domestic Battery (2007, 2009), Pedestrian 
under the Influence of Alcohol (2008), Burglary amended to Petit Theft (2008) and Domestic Assault 
amended to Disturbing the Peace (2003). During the times his license was suspended, he continued 
to drive. 
Given his age, his behavior on retained jurisdiction through CAPP was not very good. 
However, the Court placed him on probation following his retained jurisdiction and ordered him to 
successfully complete Drug Court. 
His performance in Drug Court was poor. While the Court gave him two opportunities to 
succeed in Drug Court, he continued to be deceptive and try to avoid following the rules. Murphy 
was in Drug Court from July 13, 2011, until February 2013, nearly 2 years. He never made it past 
Phase II when most complete all four phases within 17-18 months. 
The second time, Drug Court requested discharge because Murphy was forging his green 
cards and justified his forgery on his desire to avoid being in trouble for failing to attend his 
meetings. After nearly two years he was still blaming other people for his failings. In addition, it took 
him one year to phase up to Phase II when the normal time in Phase I is four months. Throughout his 
participation in Drug Court, he was manipulative and deceptive. 
The Court also carefully considered alternatives to imposing sentence and revoking 
probation. Murphy had previously enjoyed the benefits of a retained jurisdiction and programming. 
Probation was not an option and the Court determined that a retained jurisdiction was not 
appropriate. Therefore, in an exercise of its discretion, the Court determined that alternatives to 
imprisonment were not adequate to meet the state's legitimate interest in punishment, deterrence, or 
the protection of society. See State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 20 P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001). 
The Court found that in order to deter future such crimes by Murphy, this disposition was 
necessary. There is a need to deter Murphy from such behavior. The Court found that the magnitude 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
26 RECONSIDERATION OF SENTENCE PURSUANT TO I.C.R. 35 
CASE NO. CR-FE-20I0-17464 4 
000129 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
of this crime outweighed Murphy's character and background. Therefore, the Court found that this 
sentence would promote rehabiiitation; there is a need for some punishment that fits the crime before 
real rehabilitation will be effective. Finally, the Court finds that the crime itself simply deserves this 
punishment. It is a serious crime. The Court finds that this sentence fulfills the objectives of 
protecting society and achieves deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution and therefore denies 
Murphy's Motion for Reconsideration. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 8th day of April 2013. 
Cheri C. Copsey 
District Judge 
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